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Abstract
Revolutionaries and Spies is a game, G(G, r, s, k), played on a
graph G between two teams: one team consists of r revolutionar-
ies, the other consists of s spies. To start, each revolutionary chooses
a vertex as its position. The spies then do the same. (Throughout
the game, there is no restriction on the number of revolutionaries and
spies that may be positioned on any given vertex.) The revolutionar-
ies and spies then alternate moves with the revolutionaries going first.
To move, each revolutionary simultaneously chooses to stay put on its
vertex or to move to an adjacent vertex. The spies move in the same
way. The goal of the revolutionaries is to place k of their team on some
vertex v in such a way that the spies cannot place one of their spies at
v in their next move; this is a win for the revolutionaries. If the spies
can prevent this forever, they win. There is no hidden information;
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2the positions of all revolutionaries and spies is known to both sides at
all times.
We will present a number of basic results as well as the result that
if G(Z2, r, s, 2) is a win for the spies, then s ≥ 6b r8c. (Here allowable
moves in Z2 consist of one-step horizontal, vertical or diagonal moves.)
1 Introduction
Let G be a graph, possibly infinite, and let r, s, k be positive integers. Rev-
olutionaries and Spies, denoted G(G, r, s, k), is the following game invented
by Beck [1]. G(G, r, s, k) is played between two teams of agents. The first
team is a team of r “revolutionaries” and the second a team of s “spies”.
In round 0, each revolutionary takes a position on some vertex of G and,
afterwards, each spy does the same. There is no restriction on the number of
spies or revolutionaries that may be placed on a vertex at any point in the
game. For i ≥ 1, round i begins with each revolutionary moving either to a
vertex adjacent to its current vertex or staying at its current vertex. Round
i ends with the spies moving in the same fashion. The revolutionaries have
a meeting of size k at a vertex v if k or more revolutionaries are present at
that vertex. A meeting at vertex v is guarded if a spy is present at v. The
revolutionaries win G(G, r, s, k) if they can guarantee an unguarded meeting
of size k at the end of some round after the spies have had one move to
respond. Otherwise the spies have a strategy to prevent this for all time and
we say the spies win G(G, r, s, k). Note that when the revolutionaries first
form a number of meetings of size k, the spies have one move to guard them
all. If the spies succeed, the game continues; otherwise, the revolutionaries
win.
Continuous versions of this problem can also be considered. For example,
one could play the game in the plane, where each agent has the power to
move to points within Euclidean distance 1 from their current position. Or
the agents may move continuously at rates less than or equal to 1. These
variants were suggested by Beck [1].
There is a similarity between the moves in Spies and Revolutionaries and
Cops and Robbers [5, 6]. The latter game is a pursuit game played by a
cop and a robber on a graph G: the cop chooses a vertex, then the robber
chooses a vertex, and players move alternately starting with the cop. A move
consists of either staying at one’s present vertex or moving to an adjacent
3vertex; each move is seen by both players. The cop wins if he manages to
occupy the same vertex as the robber and the robber wins if he avoids this
forever. The graphs on which the cop has a winning strategy have been
characterized [5, 6].
Definition 1.1 Let G be a graph and let r and k be positive integers. We de-
fine σ(G, r, k) to be the minimum value of s such that the spies win G(G, r, s, k).
We record the following trivial observation.
Lemma 1.2 If G is a graph, then
min
{
|V (G)|,
⌊ r
k
⌋}
≤ σ(G, r, k) ≤ min{|V (G)|, r − k + 1}
Proof: For the lower bound, observe that the revolutionaries can construct
min
{|V (G)|, ⌊ r
k
⌋}
meetings of size k on distinct vertices in their first move.
The spies must be able to guard all of these meetings. The upper bound
is obtained by considering two separate strategies for the spies. The spies
could win by using |V (G)| spies to permanently guard each vertex. The spies
could also win by picking r− k + 1 revolutionaries to follow, assigning them
distinct spies to stay on their respective positions. The spies win with this
strategy as well, as every meeting of size k will involve a revolutionary that
is being followed.
This trivial lower bound from Lemma 1.2 is attained on acyclic graphs.
Theorem 1.3 If G is an acyclic graph, then
σ(G, r, k) = min
{
|V (G)|,
⌊ r
k
⌋}
.
This theorem was initially proved by one of the authors in an equivalent
form in [7]. The proof of Theorem 1.3 will appear in [3] which covers Revo-
lutionaries and Spies on trees and unicyclic graphs. It would be interesting
to characterize those graphs G for which σ(G, r, k) = min
{|V (G)|, ⌊ r
k
⌋}
. By
Theorem 2.3 all powers of acyclic graphs are included.
For v, w ∈ V (G), let dG(v, w) be the distance between v and w in G, i.e.
the minimum length of an v,w-path in G. If no such path exists, then let
dG(v, w) = +∞. Note dG(v, v) = 0.
4Let G and H be graphs. The strong product of G and H, denoted GH,
is the graph with vertex set V (G) × V (H) such that vertices (g, h) and
(g′, h′) are adjacent in G  H if and only if (g, h) 6= (g′, h′), dG(g, g′) ≤ 1,
and dH(h, h
′) ≤ 1. We denote by Z the graph G with V (G) = Z and
E(G) = {{i, i+ 1} : i ∈ Z}. For d ≥ 1, let Zd be the d-fold strong product
of Z with itself.
We study Revolutionaries and Spies on Zd. Perhaps one of the most
basic (yet nontrivial) quantities to study is the threshold σ(Zd, r, 2).
Theorem 1.4 If d is an integer with d ≥ 2, then σ(Zd, r, 2) ≥ 6 ⌊ r
8
⌋
.
Note that Lemma 1.2 only implies σ(Zd, r, 2) ≥ ⌊ r
2
⌋
. We conjecture that
σ(Zd, r, 2) = r − 2 for d ≥ 2.
While this manuscript was under review the authors learned of the work
in progress of several other authors.
Theorem 1.3 has been generalized in [3] to the case of unicyclic graphs
G: σ(G, r, k) ∈ {⌊ r
k
⌋
,
⌈
r
k
⌉} and furthermore if k - r, then σ(G, r, k) = ⌊ r
k
⌋
if
and only if ` ≤ max{⌊ r
k
⌋ − t + 2, 3} where ` is the length of the cycle and
t = |V (G)| − `.
Revolutionaries and Spies has now been studied on interval graphs, hyper-
cubes, random graphs, complete multipartite graphs, and also on a common
generalization of trees and graphs with a dominating vertex [2].
The organization of the paper is as follows: we present a number of basic
definitions and results in Section 2 and then prove Theorem 1.4 in Section 3.
2 Basic Results
Note that if r′, r, k′, and k are integers with r′ ≥ r ≥ 1 and k′ ≥ k ≥ 1,
then σ(G, r′, k) ≥ σ(G, r, k) and σ(G, r, k′) ≤ σ(G, r, k). For example, if
G(G, r′, s, k) is a win for the spies, then so is G(G, r, s, k): the spies use
their winning strategy in G(G, r′, s, k) to play G(G, r, s, k) as if there were an
additional r′ − r revolutionaries fixed on some vertex.
Lemma 2.1 Let k =
∑c
i=1 ki and r =
∑c
i=1 ri, where all quantities are
positive integers. For any graph G,
σ(G, r, k − c+ 1) ≤
c∑
i=1
σ(G, ri, ki)
5Proof:
Let si = σ(G, ki, ri) for 1 ≤ i ≤ c, and set s =
∑c
i=1 si. We claim
G(G, r, s, k−c+1) is a win for the spies. The spies divide the revolutionaries
into c disjoint groups Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ c, where Ri consists of ri revolutionaries.
The spies are also divided into disjoint groups Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ c, where Si consists
of si spies. For 1 ≤ i ≤ c the spies simultaneously use group Si to prevent
a meeting of size ki amongst the revolutionaries in group Ri. The largest
possible unguarded meeting under this strategy is
∑c
i=1(ki − 1) = k − c.
Note that if r, a, k are positive integers, then Lemma 2.1 implies the three
inequalities σ(G, r + a, k + a) ≤ σ(G, r, k), σ(G, r + a, k) ≤ σ(G, r, k) + a,
and σ(G, ar, ak) ≤ aσ(G, r, k).
Lemma 2.2 If G is a graph and a is a positive integer, then σ(G, ar, ak) ≥
σ(G, r, k).
Proof: Let s = σ(G, ar, ak). We claim that G(G, r, s, k) is a win for
the spies. The spies identify each revolutionary with a group of a revolu-
tionaries sharing the same position and then follow their winning strategy
in G(G, ar, s, ak). The spies prevent a meeting of size k in G(G, r, s, k) in
this way because the corresponding groups will form a meeting of size ak in
G(G, ar, s, ak).
If G is a graph, the nth power of G is the graph Gn with V (Gn) = V (G)
and E(Gn) = {{v, w} : 0 < dG(v, w) ≤ n}.
Theorem 2.3 If G is a graph, then σ(Gn, r, k) ≤ σ(G, r, k).
Proof: Let s = σ(G, r, k). We show that G(Gn, r, s, k) is a win for the
spies. Let R0 be the initial position of the revoluationaries. The spies play
the position S0 from their winning strategy in G(G, r, s, k). If the revo-
lutionaries move to a new position Rn in G
n, then there are intermediate
positions R1, . . . , Rn−1 such that Ri is one move from Ri−1 in G(G, r, s, k).
Let S1, . . . , Sn be the corresponding countermoves for the spies in their win-
ning strategy in G(G, r, s, k). Since Sn is one move from S0 in Gn, the spies
may play Sn as their response to Rn in G(Gn, r, s, k) and the process repeats.
This strategy indefinitely prevents a meeting of size k.
6Theorem 2.4 If G and H are graphs, then
σ(GH, r, k) ≥ max(σ(G, r, k), σ(H, r, k)).
Proof: When playing the game G(G  H, r, s, k), the revolutionaries can
choose to play only in a single copy of G (or H). Regardless of where the
spies play, the revolutionaries can project the spies’ positions into the chosen
copy of G. If the revolutionaries can win G(G, r, s, k) against the projected
spies, then they can win in G  H. Thus σ(G  H, r, s) ≥ σ(G, r, s). The
same argument works for H. Thus, the theorem follows.
3 Proof of Theorem 1.4.
As a warmup, we prove
Theorem 3.1 If r and k are positive integers, then σ(Z, r, k) =
⌊
r
k
⌋
.
Proof: For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, let xi be the position of the ith revolutionary in Z
and let x′i be its position one move later. Let x(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x(r) be the order
statistics of the sequence x, i.e. a rearrangement of the xi into non-decreasing
order. Let x′(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x′(r) be the order statistics of the sequence x′. Let
s =
⌊
r
k
⌋
. The spies’ strategy is to place the ith spy at position yi = x(ik)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ s. This clearly prevents an unguarded meeting of size k. If the
spies are then able to move to the positions y′i = x
′
(ik), this strategy will be
sustainable.
It suffices to show that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, |x(i) − x′(i)| ≤ 1. If x(i) = x0,
then there are at least i revolutionaries on integers less than or equal to x0.
After one move these same i revolutionaries are on positions x0 + 1 or less,
meaning x′(i) ≤ x0 + 1 = x(i) + 1. Similarly x(i) ≤ x′(i) + 1.
Recall that a, b ∈ Zd are adjacent if and only a 6= b and |ai − bi| ≤ 1 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
7Lemma 3.2 If r and k are positive integers with 1 ≤ k ≤ r/2, then σ(Zd, r, k) ≤
r − 2k + 2.
Proof: Clearly σ(Zd, 2k − 1, k) ≥ 1. We give a strategy for the spies
showing that σ(Zd, 2k − 1, k) = 1. Suppose the revolutionaries are in some
position. Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Let xi,1, . . . , xi,2k−1 be the ith coordinates of
the revolutionaries. Let ci = xi,(k) be their kth order statistic. The spies’
response is to move the spy to the vertex c = (c1, . . . , cd). By the argument
in Theorem 3.1, this is a playable strategy for the spies. Furthermore, it
guards all meetings of size k or more. Lemma 2.1 implies σ(Zd, r, k) ≤
σ(Zd, r − 2k + 1, 1) + σ(Zd, 2k − 1, k) ≤ (r − 2k + 1) + 1 = r − 2k + 2.
Theorem 1.4 will follow from this next theorem (see Corollary 3.4).
Theorem 3.3 We have σ(Z2, 8, 2) = 6.
Proof: By Lemma 3.2, σ(Z2, 8, 2) ≤ 6. To complete the proof, we give a
winning strategy for the revolutionaries in G(Z2, 8, 5, 2). In the first round,
the revolutionaries place their agents on the eight positions (±1,±1) and
(±3,±3) (see Figure 1). In all of our figures the center point is position
(0, 0), and each X represents a revolutionary while each O represents a spy.
If two revolutionaries may reach a vertex in n rounds, then there must be a
spy within distance n of v to guard that potential meeting. We often describe
this by saying that a spy must guard a meeting at v in n rounds.
Claim 1 (Box Property): One or more spies must begin in each of the four
boxes [1, 3]× [1, 3], [1, 3]× [−3,−1],[−3,−1]× [−3,−1], [−3,−1]× [1, 3]; we
call these boxes B1, B2, B3, and B4 respectively (see Figure 1).
By symmetry, we consider B1. The revolutionaries at (3, 3) and (1, 1)
may form a meeting at (2, 2) in one round; at least one spy must be in B1 to
guard this meeting.
Let W1 be the “wedge” of points W1 = {(x, y) : y ≥ 1, y ≥ |x|}. We
also consider the wedges obtained from W1 by reflections in the lines y = x
and y = −x; in clockwise order from W1, we call these W2, W3, and W4 (see
Figure 1).
Claim 2 (Wedge Property): There must be at least two spies present in W1;
furthermore one of those spies must be distance 1 from (0, 2) and another
distinct spy must be at distance 3 from (0, 6). We call this the wedge property
8B3
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Figure 1: The revolutionaries’ initial position, the boxes Bi, and wedges Wi.
for W1. By symmetry (reflections through the lines y = x and y = −x),
analogous wedge properties hold for W2, W3, and W4.
By symmetry we consider W1. The revolutionaries at (−1, 1) and (1, 1)
can form a meeting in one round at (0, 2) while, simultaneously, the revolu-
tionaries at (−3, 3) and (3, 3) can form a meeting at (0, 6) in three rounds.
Unless two spies are located as described, one of these meetings will be un-
covered.
By symmetry and the pigeonhole principle, we may assume that at least
two spies, s′1 and s
′′
1, have positions (x, y) with x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0. In fact, we
may assume that there are exactly two such spies, since each of the boxes B2,
B3, and B4 must contain a spy; we call those spies s2, s3, and s4 respectively.
Since the wedge property holds for W3 and W4, spy s3 must lie in both
wedges; furthermore its position must be either (−3,−3) or (−1,−1). This
leads to the two cases below.
Case 1: s3 is at (−3,−3)
The following discussion is illustrated in Figure 2. Since s3 is at (−3,−3),
the wedge property for W4 implies that s4 is in [−3,−1]×{1}. Similarly, s2 is
in {1}× [−3,−1]. Furthermore, s′1 must be in [0, 1]× [0, 1] to guard against a
meeting at (0, 0) by the revolutionaries at (−1,−1) and (1, 1); neither s2 nor
s4 can guard (0, 0), since they must guard against the meetings at (2,−2)
and (−2, 2). Given these restrictions on s′1, s2, and s4, the wedge properties
9Figure 2: Case 1.
for W1 and W2 imply that s
′′
1 must be at (3, 3).
Suppose that the revolutionaries at (−1, 1) and (−1,−1) form a meeting
at (−2, 0) and those from (−3, 3) and (1, 1) form a meeting at (−1, 3). Let
(x, y) be the position of s′1. We must have y ≥ 1 because, since spy s4 must
guard (−2, 0), s′1 must guard (−1, 3). By symmetry, x ≥ 1. Thus s′1 is
at (1, 1). Now s4 must be in [−2,−1] × {1} to guard against a meeting at
(−1, 0) of revolutionaries from (−1, 1) and (−1,−1). Similarly s2 must be in
{1} × [−2,−1].
We also must have s4 = (−1, 1) or s2 = (1,−1). If not, then the revolu-
tionaries at (−1, 1) and (−1,−1) can meet at (0, 0), while the revolutionaries
at (1, 1) and (1,−1) can meet at (2, 0). It will not be possible for the spies
to guard both meetings. By symmetry we may assume s4 = (−1, 1).
Thus at the beginning of round 1, we may assume that the spies and
revolutionaries are located as in Figure 3. This figure indicates that s2 is
located somewhere in R2 = {1} × [−2,−1]. The revolutionaries’ strategy is
to move the revolutionary at (−1,−1) to (−2,−2) and the one at (−1, 1) to
(0, 0), while keeping the other revolutionaries in place.
We now analyze the positions that the spies must take at the end of round
1, see Figure 4. The spies must keep the spies at (3, 3) and (−3, 3) fixed to
continue guarding meetings at (±6, 0) and (0,±6). Besides these two spies,
only the spy in R2 (and only if it were located at (1,−2)) could be moved
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Figure 3: Case 1: at the end of round 0.
to help guard (0,−6), but that spy cannot assist, as it must also guard the
meeting of the revolutionaries at (−2,−2) and (1,−1) at the point (0,−3).
Let (a, b) be the position of the spy in R2 in round 0, and let (a
′, b′) be its
position in round 1. We have a′ = 1, since this spy must guard (2,−2) and
also the meeting of (−2,−2) and (1,−1) at (−1,−3). We must have b′ ≤ −2,
since this spy must guard the meeting of the revolutionaries at (−2,−2) and
(3,−3) at (1,−5). Thus, the spies must have a spy in R′2 = {1} × [−3,−2]
at the end of round 1. (See Figure 4.)
The spy located originally at (1, 1) cannot decrease its x-coordinate, be-
cause it must guard (2, 0). This forces the spy originally located at (−1, 1)
to decrease its y-coordinate to guard (−1,−1). This same spy must also
decrease its x-coordinate to guard against the meeting of the revolutionaries
from (−3, 3) and (−2,−2) at (−5, 1). This forces the spy at (1, 1) to move
to (1, 0) to guard meetings at (2, 0), (0, 1), and (0,−1). Note that the spy in
R′2 cannot help guard these, since it independently must guard the meeting
at (1,−5) by revolutionaries from (−2,−2) and (3,−3).
Now the revolutionaries at (−3, 3) and (1, 1) can form an unguarded meet-
ing at (−1, 3) in 2 moves, see Figure 4.
Case 2: s3 is at (−1,−1)
Since s3 is at (−1,−1) the wedge property implies that s2 is in [1, 3]×{−3}
and s4 is in {−3} × [1, 3]. If s2 is at (3,−3) and s4 is at (−3, 3), then the
11
R′2
Figure 4: Case 1: at the end of round 1.
revolutionaries from (−1, 1) and (−1,−1) can form a meeting at (−2, 0),
which must be guarded by s3. Simultaneously, the revolutionaries at (1,−1)
and (−3,−3) can form a meeting at (−1,−3), which will be unguarded (see
Figure 5).
Without loss of generality, suppose instead that s2 is not at (3,−3). By
the wedge property for W2, we must have s
′
1 is in [1, 3] × [0, 1] and s′′1 is in
[3, 9] × [0, 3]. (See Figure 6). In fact, s′1 must be at (1, 1) in order to guard
the meeting at (0, 2). Now the revolutionaries at (−1,−1) and (1,−1) can
form a meeting at (0,−1). This must be guarded by s3. Simultaneously,
the revolutionaries at (−1, 1) and (−3,−3) can form a meeting at (−3,−1)
in two rounds; it can only be guarded if s4 began at (−3, 1). By symmetry
s2 must begin at (1,−3). Since now s′′1 must guard the meeting at (0, 6), it
must be located at (3, 3), see Figure 6.
Thus at the end of round 0, the spies and revolutionaries are positioned
as in Figure 7.
The revolutionaries’ strategy is to move the revolutionary at (−1, 1) to
(0, 0) and the one at (1, 1) to (2, 1) while leaving all other revolutionaries
unchanged. Figure 8 illustrates how the spies must be located at the end of
round 1 in order to compensate. The spies must leave the spy at (3, 3) in place
to guard (6, 0) and (0, 6). At the end of its move, the spy at (−3, 1) must be
somewhere in L4 = [−4,−3]× [0, 2] as it must guard (−6, 0). Similarly, the
12
Figure 5: Case 2: at the end of round 0, Part 1.
Figure 6: Case 2: at the end of round 0, Part 2.
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Figure 7: Case 2: at the end of round 0, Part 3.
spy at (1,−3) must remain in L2 = [0, 2]× [−4,−3].
The spy at (−1,−1) must stay in place to guard meetings at (−2,−2) and
(0, 0) in one move. (Note: the spy at (−1,−1) must guard (0, 0), since the spy
at (1, 1) must guard against the potential meeting of the revolutionaries from
(2, 1) and (1,−1) at the point (2, 0).) Spy s′1 must move to (1, 0) to protect
against meetings (0,−1), (1, 1), (2, 1) in the next round. Spy s3 cannot help,
since it must protect (−2,−2), see Figure 8.
The revolutionaries’ strategy at the beginning of round 2 is to simulta-
neously move revolutionaries (0, 0) and (−1,−1) to (−1, 0), revolutionaries
(1,−1) and (−3,−3) to (−1,−3), and revolutionaries (2, 1) and (3,−3) to
(4,−1). Only the spy at (−1,−1) can guard the first meeting, and conse-
quently only the spy in L2 can guard either of the other two meetings. Thus
the revolutionaries win.
Corollary 3.4 Theorem 3.3 implies Theorem 1.4.
Proof: The winning strategy for the revolutionaries in G(Z2, 8, 5, 2) given
in Theorem 3.3 does not involve movement of the revolutionaries outside of
the box [−6, 6]2 and takes no more than 5 moves to achieve a meeting of size
14
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Figure 8: Case 2: at the end of round 1.
2. Thus a spy outside the box [−11, 11]2 can not help prevent a meeting of
size 2.
We play many independent copies of this game to show that the revolu-
tionaries have a winning strategy in G(Z2, r, 6 ⌊ r
8
⌋ − 1, 2). For each i with
1 ≤ i ≤ ⌊ r
8
⌋
, eight revolutionaries are placed at positions (30i, 0) + (±1,±1)
and (30i, 0) + (±3,±3). The spies must place at most five spies in some box
(30i, 0) + [−11, 11]2, and the revolutionaries then can play there according to
their winning strategy in G(Z2, 8, 5, 2) to achieve a meeting of size 2. Thus
σ(Z2, r, 2) ≥ 6 ⌊ r
8
⌋
.
By Theorem 2.4, σ(Zd, r, 2) ≥ σ(Z2, r, 2) ≥ 6 ⌊ r
8
⌋
for d ≥ 2.
4 Conclusion
The authors would like to thank the editor and the referees for their many
helpful comments. We are grateful for the comprehensive suggestions of one
referee that greatly simplified our proof of Theorem 1.4.
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